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No Longer. Not Yet. The Promise of Labour Law
David Mangan*
I. INTRODUCTION
No longer. Not yet. These two phrases summarise the promise of British labour/employ-
ment law.1 There have been fleeting moments of positive steps towards employment
protections. And yet, the focus of efforts remains to improve the present. Labour law
has become a source of lament insofar as its contemporary form resembles little from
a few decades prior and, simultaneously, offers tantalising bits of hope for better days.
There have been a number of publications pronouncing a pessimistic state for labour
law.2 This perspective originates in a view of the discipline that expects more of contem-
porary worker protections and reflects back on the 1980s as a period of tremendous
decline on this account.
Economic duress is a theme that runs through the collective-dominant to the indi-
vidual-dominant periods of labour law. Complaints about economic duress (the per-
ceived unfair influence of trade unions by way of industrial action) were part of the
movement that brought about the decline in collective labour law in the 1980s. An
amended form of the argument is being used again today. Illustrating the contemporary
usage, employment tribunal procedure reforms (such as the introduction of fees for
claims) passed in and around 2013 were premised on the idea of improving the
economy (perhaps a first for economic stimulus). Threatening to continue the ‘not
yet’ era of labour law, this example demonstrates how the imperative of commercial
* Osgoode Hall Law School. I am grateful to Professor Tonia Novitz for her remarks on this work. Errors
and omissions are my own. Professor Andrew Huxley (SOAS) passed away during the preparation of this
article. His witty advice will be greatly missed. Email: dmangan@osgoode.yorku.ca
1 Even the name of the discipline signifies division: where labour law is viewed as containing the historical
and employment the more current aspects. Labour law will be used to encompass the law relating to those
who engage in paid work; that is the law pertaining to the labour of the individual. The term includes both
the collective and the individual: LordWedderburn, ‘Deregulation and Labour Law in Britain andWestern
Europe’ (1988–89) 6 Hofstra Labor Law Journal 135, 137.
2 The premise of unrealised potential may be applied to the UK as well as other jurisdictions. See for
example, C Barnard, S Deakin and GS Morris (eds), The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Bob
Hepple Q.C. (Hart Publishing 2004); G Davidov and B Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford
University Press 2011).
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viability not only dictates labour regulation, but may also prove to continue the area’s
decline. Although the hope of better days remains alive, it is in a muted form.
II. NO LONGER
The characterisation of labour law remains an obstacle. One moment that may signal a
point of no return to the days of greater union influence may be the foreword by then-
Prime Minister Tony Blair in Fairness at Work. He wrote: ‘There will be no going back.
The days of strikes without ballots, mass picketing, closed shop and secondary actions
are over.’3 Though a rhetorical characterisation of labour law, this quotation remains
instructive for it conveys how labour law has been received: a discipline about disruption
to business.
The decline of the collective in labour law has been extensively engaged. These writings
chart decay in trade unions’ role in contemporary Britain. Today, looking for positives, it
may be said that unions play a practical role in streamlining discussions surrounding the
workforce: providing employers with an efficient means of communicating with workers
and facilitating workplace changes.4 The role measures the shift from the social function of
labour law to a focus on its utility in supporting economic goals. Here is the division repre-
senting the contrast between no longer and not yet. Labour law remains, for employee-side
practitioners and a large academic cohort, an area concerned with ‘struggle’5 amongst
social groups. However, as defined by governments of differing political affiliations,
labour law is conceived of as a support to economic growth.
The deterioration of trade union membership (and influence),6 sitting at about
25.6% as of May 2014,7 in the UK ran concurrently with the rise of economic concerns
becoming the guiding force in decision-making. Unions themselves were viewed as
obstacles to desired economic growth. Trade unions, it was alleged, had ‘abused’ their
power through industrial action that harmed ‘innocent third parties’ and consumers.8
3 Fairness at Work (Cm 3968) (TSO 1998), 2.
4 The information and consultation aspects of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act
1992 are one example.
5 B Hepple QC, ‘Factors Influencing the Making of Labour Law’ in G Davidov and B Langille (eds) The Idea
of Labour Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 30, 42.
6 The high-water mark was 1979 when there were 13 million members. From 1980 to the mid-1990s there
was a steady decline in membership. Since that time, the percentage of the unionised workforce has largely
shrunk (though it increased in 2010–11) and sits at about 6.5 million, a drop of 6000 members or 0.1%:
Department for Business Innovation & Skills (BIS), Trade Union Membership 2013 (London: BIS, 2014)
[Trade Union Membership 2013], 5.
7 ‘This is the lowest rate of trade union membership recorded between 1995 and 2013. Over this period, the
proportion of employees who were trade union members in the UK has decreased around 7 percentage
points, from 32.4 per cent in 1995’: Trade Union Membership 2013 (n 6) 5. It should be noted that
there has been an increase in membership in the private sector, as of May 2014, to about 2.6 million
members.
8 B Simpson, ‘British Labour Relations in the 1980s: Learning to Live with the Law’ (1986) 49 Modern Law
Review 796, 810.
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Legislative reforms were passed to undercut the force unions could possibly have. The
‘traditional public policy of encouraging the spread of collective bargaining’ was
found to be incompatible with a ‘more market-oriented analysis of economic pro-
blems’.9 This topic has been the subject of much discussion and will not be repeated
here. It is remarkable, nevertheless, how successful the strategy continues to be. It
tapped into something of a human bias: as a result of others, the individual is being
held back from making progress. Trade unions became the quintessential example.
Democratising trade unions was another touchstone. Looking back, democratisation
arguments were the precursor to individualistic aims. The increasing role of government
in labour relations regulation has led to the pre-eminence of the individual contract of
employment as the embodiment of mutual obligations between employer and worker, a
setting described as encouraging ‘forms of marginal employment which are subject to a
minimum of protective rights for workers, as well as direct erosion… of rights’.10 Criti-
cism remains non-partisan, extending beyond the Conservatives of the 1980s. Noting
the ‘public relations verbiage’ found in Fairness at Work, one may point to the then-
newly elected Labour party’s document as lacking ‘the necessary commitment to collec-
tive bargaining as an “industrial relations good”’.11 Despite the addition of a national
minimum wage, one commentator wrote with dismay of Labour’s continuation of the
economic foundation for employment regulation: the minimum wage ‘is heavily quali-
fied by the government’s evident deference to the view that social rights for workers are a
part of employers’ labour costs which must be minimised in the interests of maintaining
their ability to compete in increasingly global markets’.12
In assessing the decline of collective laissez-faire in the 1980s, Professor Collins
characterised the period as a ‘productive disintegration’.13 He applauded Professors
Davies and Freedland14 for providing a means to engage with the individual rights of
employment law. Furthermore and most prominently, the 1980s legislation should be
viewed not as ‘a blunt attack on collective bargaining and trade unions, but a new
anti-inflation strategy.’15 The conclusion: labour law must be situated within the
context of macroeconomic policies.16 Now, economic policy dominates discussions.
The move to a macroeconomic focus has compelled consideration of the workforce
as part of one grouping (collective) – the workforce of the company that is England com-
peting amongst global entities. From this notion key terms such as efficiency and
9 Ibid, 800, where Simpson’s review cited P Davies and M Freedland, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law
(Stevens, 3rd edn 1983).
10 Ibid, 816.
11 B Simpson, ‘Fairness at Work’ (1998) 27 Industrial Law Journal 245, 248.
12 Ibid, 252.
13 H Collins, ‘The Productive Disintegration of Labour Law’ (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 295, 303.
14 P Davies and M Freedland, ‘Labour Law and the Public Interest – Collective Bargaining and Economic
Policy’ in Lord Wedderburn and WT Murphy (eds), Labour Law and the Community: Perspectives of
the 1980s (Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 1982) 13, 14.
15 Collins (n 13) 303.
16 Ibid.
King’s Law Journal 131
productivity originate. It has been asserted that the ‘collectivist interpretation of the
system of industrial relations’ has been unreceptive to considerations of individual
rights.17 And yet, nuance appears to be the key point: collectivists were highly suspicious
of an individualist system that had freedom to contract as its underlying ethos.18 This
concern, retrospectively, was not unfounded. The greater success achieved by trade
unions in relation to employment protections must be a testament to the power of
the collective over that of the individual. Usurpation of individual rights was not the
aim. Instead the collective was the better strategy to achieve the end goal of greater
employment protection and increased remuneration packages (whether that be monet-
ary gains or other improvements). And still, the success of collectives was eschewed
because it was perceived to have come at the expense of the country’s economic strength.
The judiciary played an integral role in the encompassing force of the term economic
duress. It did not accept that there could be ‘an area of legitimate industrial conflict
within which the restraints of the common law should not apply’.19 ‘Privileges’20
(language employed by Friedrich von Hayek) has been aptly used as a descriptor of
what unions sought according to the judiciary: trade unions were seeking privileged
status to undertake activities which the economic minds of the judiciary deemed
harmful. The House of Lords decision in Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v Inter-
national Transport Workers Federation21 offered a convenient illustration. The case con-
cerned the Federation’s campaign to ‘black-flag’ ships flying ‘flags of convenience’; a
means for shipowners to avoid employment protections for crewmembers. The court
refused to look at this as a case pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment
for seafarers; that is as a labour dispute (the golden formula being inapplicable).22 The
Federation conceded that its campaign constituted economic duress. In essence, the con-
cession was that the Federation’s work to protect members fell foul of one of the few
limitations English contract law imposes upon parties.23 The concession remains impor-
tant because duress requires particular facts to establish the case. Furthermore, duress
claims can often become mixed in with arguments (often made by the academic com-
munity) regarding a need for good faith in English contract law, something of a hotly
contested area to which no resolution seems foreseeable.24
17 Ibid, 304.
18 Beyond legislation, the ‘residue’ of English law is the common law and its premise of freedom of contract
separates British labour law from other systems: Wedderburn (n 1) 137.
19 B Simpson, ‘A Not So Golden Formula: In Contemplation or Furtherance of a Trade Dispute After 1982’
(1983) 46 Modern Law Review 463, 465.
20 Ibid, 466.
21 [1982] 2 WLR 803 [Universe Tankships].
22 Simpson noted the uncertainty as to what the court was saying inUniverse Tankships: Simpson (n 19), 468.
23 Duress (along with misrepresentation and undue influence) remains a concept to which the English
common law points when it is criticised for having no duty of good faith.
24 Some momentum to the argument for good faith obligations in English contract law has arisen from the
decision in Yam Seng Ptd Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [2013] 1 All
ER (Comm) 1321 and commentaries derived therefrom such as H Collins, ‘Implied Terms: The Foun-
dation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing’ (2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 297 and D Campbell, ‘Good
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Viewing labour law history as a story of the collective and individual periods, the
latter being the present, duress is a common touchstone for economic interests. In
the collective era, duress (particularly economic duress) was a sort of rallying call
against trade unions. Putting the concession in Universe Tankships aside, Lord Wedder-
burn gave a reminder that it was ‘inevitable’25 that economic duress would enter into the
labour law discussion because coercion is at the heart of contracts of employment: ‘The
individual worker who accepts engagement rather than starve or who obeys an employ-
er’s orders rather than be dismissed into unemployment is not normally understood by
lawyers to have suffered from “economic duress” (though his will was surely “over-
borne”).’26 Coercion is contract negotiation if we are to follow the comments in a
leading decision: ‘Illegitimate pressure must be distinguished from the rough and
tumble of the pressures of normal commercial bargaining.’27
With the 1980s, England embraced the argument of duress in order to tame the
influence of unions. Further into the twenty-first century, duress arguments persist.
They have moved away from trade unions.28 The durability of the duress argument
should be appreciated because, agree or disagree, it remains a remarkably influential
premise, facilitating a change that sees workers (employment regulation of individual
workers) replacing trade unions as the anchor of the economy.
III. NOT YET
Employment regulation has once again been viewed as a problem and economic duress
has underpinned the argument for reform. Now, it is not the legal concept taken from
contract law but the phrase in a non-legal sense. Individual workers present economic
problems. First, workers may too easily launch an employment claim. Once claims
are made employers incur costs.29 Surveys of employers are used to evidence the
Faith and the Ubiquity of the “Relational Contract”’ (2014) 77Modern Law Review 460. Professor Douglas
Brodie – D Brodie, ‘How Relational Is the Employment Contract?’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 232 –
has doubted the viability of the intersection between relational contracts (per Macneil) and UK employ-
ment law. For some time Professor McKendrick has argued against adoption of relational contracts in the
UK: E McKendrick, ‘Long-Term Contracts in English Law’ in J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds), Good
Faith and Fault in English Law (Clarendon Press 1995) 305.
25 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Economic Duress’ (1982) 45 Modern Law Review 556, 560.
26 Ibid.
27 DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo-Services ASA [2000] BLR 530, [131].
28 The wage premium (the difference in pay between unionised and non-unionised workers) has declined
since 1995 to the point that the ‘trade union wage premium for public sector workers was 10.5 percentage
points lower in 2013 compared with 1995, while for the private sector, this was 8.3 percentage points lower
over the same period’: Trade Union Membership 2013 (n 6) 9.
29 E Jordan and others, ‘Part A: Employer Perceptions and the Impact of Employment Regulation’ Employ-
ment Relations Research Series 123 (BIS, March 2013) [Jordan and others], 18. These are not new asser-
tions. For example, Lord Jones in the course of debates on the Employment Act 2008 identified abuses by
workers: Hansard HL Deb 25 February 2008, vol 699, col GC74.
King’s Law Journal 133
assertions. Consider the following: 67% of employers believe employment regulation is a
barrier to the UK’s market competitiveness; 34% of claims are withdrawn by applicants;
employers are four times more likely to win but 26% are still settling even when told they
can win.30 Second, low productivity levels in the UK obstruct economic development.
Private sector per hour labour productivity was at about 8% below its pre-crisis peak
as of August 2013,31 but it has risen by 1.7% more than expected since the recession.32
The measurement is based on comparison with the highpoint of 2007 Quarter 4
figures.33 And yet, labour law has been an area in which belief has often trumped evi-
dence.34 Preceding the recession of 2008/09, the 2007 Q4 comparator must be chal-
lenged as it represented a peak in a questioned framework.35 The danger in looking at
the predicament as one of low labour productivity is that it easily falls into a theme
that in England has a long history – worker lethargy and its associated ills. The
outlook ignores that both productivity and wages over the last 40 years have increased
and Office for National Statistics (ONS) data from July 2014 shows that productivity
has surpassed real wages (keeping in mind a figure of 87% inflation during that
period).36 This fall has been pointed to as an explanation for why UK employment
was not more greatly affected during the recession.37 It also overlooks how workers
during The Great Recession, according to the Governor of the Bank of England,
seemed to have ‘effectively priced themselves into low-productivity work at a time of
weak demand’.38 This is not to cast aside positives. For example, lower wages may
have contributed to keeping employment levels higher during trying economic times.
As well, maintaining some level of employment helps workers retain and develop new
skills.39 Still, the lower productivity figure precipitated concerns which the government
believed must be solved through these measures.
30 Confederation of British Industry, Facing the Future: CBI/Harvey Nash Employment Trends Survey 2012
(London: CBI, 2012) 25–26. This publication is used as an example of supporting surveys.
31 Bank of England, Inflation Report August 2013 (London: Bank of England, 2013) [Inflation Report August
2013], 26.
32 Bank of England, Inflation Report November 2014 (London: Bank of England, 2014), 33.
33 N Oulton and M Sebastia-Barriel, ‘Long and Short-Term Effects of the Financial Crisis on Labour Pro-
ductivity, Capital and Output’ (2013) Bank of England Working Paper No 470.
34 For an elaboration of this critique, see S Slinn, ‘The Limitations of Pieces of Paper: A Role for Social
Science in Labour Law’ (2006) 12 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 291.
35 The Bank of England questioned the sustainability of the financial services sector’s productivity prior to
the recession: Inflation Report August 2013 (n 31).
36 ONS, ‘UK Wages Over the Past Four Decades – 2014’. B van Wanrooy and others, The 2011 Workplace
Employment Relations Study: First Findings (London: BIS, 2013) [WERS 2011, First Findings] have also
noted a fall in real terms of average earnings. The recession, however, does not explain away a troubling
trend.
37 Brigid van Wanrooy et al, Employment Relations in the Shadow of Recession (Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2013) [WERS 2011 Final], 121.
38 Bank of England, ‘Remarks given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England’ Davos CBI British
Business Leaders Lunch (24 January 2014), 7.
39 Ibid, 8.
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Given the aforementioned situation, are there prospects for labour law to fulfil a
promise of improvements for workers? Recent circumstances suggest new obstacles in
the way of such realisation. The genesis of these new challenges is a focus on small to
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as the motivation for employment regulation. (SMEs
are employing enterprises with between 1 and 249 workers.)40 In the UK, BIS business
plans contained priorities which engaged with SMEs. In particular, the following
priorities are especially resonant: Markets – where part of the plan has been to create a
positive business environment by ‘implementing reforms to the BIS employment laws fra-
mework, working with other Departments to support a fair, effective and efficient labour
market’.41
The UK shares this focus on SMEs with the European Commission (EC). The EC has
emphasised the importance of work to support SMEs with the aim of creating growth
champions within the jurisdiction.42 In 2008, the Small Business Act was introduced to
foster entrepreneurship for SMEs who were poised to take advantage of globalisation.
There was a sense of frustrated urgency at that time: for example one of the headings
was entitled ‘Time for a Breakthrough’. ‘Red tape’ anchored SMEs’ progression into stron-
ger, larger businesses. Entrepreneurs were also a group of concern in ‘Think Small First’. It
seems as though continuing efforts to support the SME cohort have been identified. More
recently, the Commission has devised COSME,43 ‘the EU programme for the Competi-
tiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) running from
2014 to 2020 with a planned budget of €2.3bn’.44 COSME is overseen by the Executive
Agency for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (EASME).45
40 SMEs consist of three sub-groups: micros (1–9 employees); small (10–49 employees); and medium (50–
249 employees). This is the breakdown used by the European Commission following EU Recommen-
dation 2003/361, OJ L 124/38, 20.5.2003, ‘Concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises’.
41 This ‘Market’ priority is drawn from the BIS Business Plan 2012–2015 (2012). Other priorities are also
relevant (for example Skills – Build an internationally competitive skills base and promote more oppor-
tunities for individuals in realising their potential; Enterprise – Boost enterprise and make this the decade
of the entrepreneur. Under this action, BIS has been planning to ‘recruit and train 15,000 mentors (5000
funded by the Government Equalities Office) to provide additional mentoring capacity for SMEs.’).
42 See for example European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, The
European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions’ COM (2008) 394 final (25 June 2008), 2, where it was written: ‘capacity to build on the
growth and innovation potential of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will therefore be decisive
for the future prosperity of the EU’.
43 Established by EU Regulation 1287/2013 (11 December 2013).
44 Art 5 of EU Regulation 1287/2013 contains an outline of how the budget is to be spent.
45 http://ec.europa.eu/easme/index_en.htm accessed 9 January 2015. Of the four categories of objectives in
COSME, employment regulation efforts seem to fit best under the third, ‘improving framework con-
ditions for the competitiveness and sustainability of Union enterprises, particularly SMEs, including in
the tourism sector’; though the fourth objective also has application (‘promoting entrepreneurship and
entrepreneurial culture’). EU Commission, ‘ANNEX to the Commission Implementing Decision con-
cerning the adoption of the work programme for 2014 and the financing for the implementation of Pro-
gramme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises’ C(2014) 247
final. These are also found in Art 4(1)(c), (d) of EU Regulation 1287/2013.
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A. Employment Tribunal Reforms: Not Yet Becomes if Ever?
Against the backdrop of fostering small to medium-sized enterprises, the changes to
English employment tribunal procedure have been premised on the notion that
workers launch scores of frivolous employment claims. These actions create business
expenses, thereby draining the English economy. It must be a remarkable time when
overhaul of employment tribunal procedure is viewed as a way to improve a country’s
economy. Underlining the role of labour law as a support to economic growth, an over-
arching aim of the Coalition Government’s Employment Law Review was ‘to address the
reality that businesses see that the cost and complexity of employment laws impact on
their ability to take on staff and grow’.46
The Coalition picked up the mantle from the John Major Conservative Government
through the changes brought in by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, Part
247 as well as the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regu-
lations 2013.48 The Green Paper of the Major Conservative Government Resolving
Employment Rights Disputes: Options for Reform expressed concern over industrial tribu-
nals offering ‘a readily accessible and cost effective means of redress’.49 The 2013 package
may assist employers, but more remarkable was the government’s ambivalence regard-
ing employment protections. These reforms put into question access to redress for
potential infringements of employment rights and, most significantly, tilted the
balance more clearly towards economic stimulation rather than rights protection. In
effect, the package of reforms instituted a plan of organic dissuasion of redress as an
economic strategy.
(a) Financialising tribunal claims
The centrepiece of the reforms was costs.50 The Employment Tribunals and the Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 201351 introduced fees for bringing an employment
claim for the first time since the industrial tribunals were established by the Industrial
Training Act 1964. These monies had already been allocated to offset some of the
planned 23% budget reduction over four years (beginning in 2011).52 The government
expected to recover approximately 33% of the cost of employment tribunal proceedings
46 BIS, ‘Employment Law Review Annual Update 2012’ (London: BIS, March 2012), 6. The government
claimed that these changes would save businesses £40 million per year.
47 2013 Chapter 24. Royal Assent 25 April 2013 [ERRA].
48 SI 2013/1237 (in force as of July 2013) [2013 Regulations].
49 Employment Department, Resolving Employment Rights Disputes: Options for Reform (Cm 2707, 1994),
[1.2].
50 My gratitude to David Renton of Garden Court Chambers for his observations regarding this part.
51 SI 2013/1893 (in force 29 July 2013). For details of the fee scheme, see D Pyper and FMcGuiness, ‘Employ-
ment Tribunal Fees’ (2015) House of Commons Library SN 07081, 5–8.
52 BIS, Resolving Workplace Disputes: A Consultation (London: BIS, 2011) [Resolving Workplace Disputes] 49.
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through these fees.53 Figures for 2013–14 show that the government spent £76.4 million
on employment tribunal business and recouped £4.5 million (net) in fees (6% of expen-
diture).54 These fees underscore how employment regulation has been imbued with an
economic imperative.
The most difficult measurement is also the most important: the impact on employ-
ment adjudication. Two circumstances have been foreseeable: a decrease in the number
of claims and a rise in the number of self-represented claimants. At its core, the notion
that fees will result in a decrease in claims asks the question: does employment regulation
impact on practice in the area? The answer is, it does. The Unfair Dismissal and State-
ment of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012,55 which
doubled the qualification period for unfair dismissal from one to two years,56 confirms
the impact of employment regulation. Unfair dismissal claims fell from 50% in 2008
down to 33% of total claims in 2013. Payment of Tribunal Awards,57 from which this
data was obtained, looked at claims between September 2011 and November 2012.
The Order came into effect on 6 April 2012 which may have resulted in an increase
in the number of claims just prior to this date (an occurrence witnessed just before
the 29 July 2013 coming into force date of the Employment Tribunals and the Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013).58 The noted decrease in unfair dismissal claims
is suggestive of a similar drop in the overall number of claims with respect to the influ-
ence of the Tribunal Fees Order. A drop was predicted as a result of the introduction of
fees.59 Early data suggested there has been a significant decrease. Mr Justice Langstaff
identified a decrease in applications of one-third in his 2014 report.60 Data from Septem-
ber 2014 denoted a drop of 70% in single claims and multiple claims fell from 1500 in
April–June 2013 to 500 in the same period in 2014.61 Receipts of claims at the employ-
ment tribunal fell from an average of 48,000 new claims per quarter to 8540 new claims
in the period April to June 2014.62 These figures have arisen despite the possibility of
53 See Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Stakeholder factsheet http://www.
justice.gov.uk/downloads/tribunals/employment/et-fees-factsheet.pdf accessed 9 January 2015. Recall
many workers found completing the preceding version of ET1 forms for claims to be a ‘daunting experi-
ence’: N Busby andMMcDermont, ‘Workers, Marginalised Voices and the Employment Tribunal System:
Some Preliminary Findings’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 166, 175.
54 Pyper and McGuiness (n 51) 13.
55 SI 2012/989.
56 Ewing and Hendy have questioned the reason for the increase in the qualification period: K Ewing and J
Hendy ‘Unfair Dismissal Law Changes – Unfair?’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 115, 116.
57 IFF Research, Payment of Tribunal Awards (London: BIS, 2013) [Payment of Tribunal Awards].
58 SI 2013/1893.
59 Underhill J recorded opposition to the introduction of fees, calling it a ‘powerful disincentive’ to bringing a
claim: Fundamental Review of Employment Tribunal Rules (London: Royal Courts of Justice, 2012), [10].
60 Senior President of Tribunals’ Annual Report 2014 (London: Royal Courts of Justice, 2014) [Senior President
Report], 63.
61 Ministry of Justice, ‘Tribunal Statistics Quarterly April–June 2014’, 8.
62 Ibid, 25. Published figures differ depending on the period assessed and the breakdown of the numbers (for
example single versus multiple claims). Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunal Service (HMCTS), ‘Employment
Tribunal Fees for Individuals’ T435 (London: HMCTS, 2013), 9, is one example.
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reimbursement being ordered by tribunals for successful claimants.63 To be generous, it
may be said that the introduction of the fees scheme has had a deterrent effect.64 The
consequence of fewer cases poses some troubling potential for the growth of case law
in the area. The last monumental development at common law was the mutual obli-
gation of trust and confidence. It will remain in question whether fees reduce the prob-
ability of developments in the discipline.
Tribunal fees have been challenged by Unison but as yet the union has not been suc-
cessful. At a first hearing,65 the court found the matter to be premature.66 The govern-
ment’s submission included the following argument:
The Court was treated to lengthy citation on behalf of the Lord Chancellor of a Hansard
report of debate when the Order was introduced, in which the Minister disavowed any
intention to deter individuals from bringing a claim. She emphasised the need to
reduce what she described as ‘an inordinate number of claims’ which are ‘long-
winded, expensive, protracted and emotionally draining disputes… certainly not in the
interests of individuals or of business’.’67
This statement would appear to be an example of indirect effect where the government
contended its direct intention was to address the number of claims, but change also
deterred individuals from initiating claims. Later in 2014, the matter again reached
the Administrative Court as Unison argued it now had the evidence (largely focusing
on the costs as they affect impoverished claimants68 within the EU framework) the
court found wanting in the earlier decision.69 Again the claim failed based on the
absence of specific facts70 and evidence suggesting there was a burden on, as opposed
to a choice for, claimants to make.71 Professor Novitz has queried what evidence
63 HMCTS stated at the time tribunal fees came into effect – ‘The general position is that, if you are success-
ful, the respondent will be ordered to reimburse you’: HMCTS, ‘Employment Tribunal Fees for Individ-
uals’ T435 (2013), 7. Further guidance on reimbursement has been provided by the EAT: Portnykh v
Nomura International plc (UKEAT/0448/13/LA); Horizon Security Services Ltd v Ndeze [2014] IRLR 854;
and Look Ahead Housing and Care Ld v Chetty (UKEAT/0037/14).
64 Along the more neutral lines of statement, see Elias LJ in R (on the application of Unison) v The Lord Chan-
cellor [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin), [2015] ICR 390 [Unison (No 2)], [60], where he wrote: ‘The figures
demonstrate incontrovertibly that the fees have had a marked effect on the willingness of workers to bring
a claim but they do not prove that any of them are unable, as opposed to unwilling, to do so.’
65 Unison v Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 218 (Admin), [2014] IRLR 266 [Unison No 1].
66 ‘The mere fact that fees impose a burden on families with limited means and that they may have to use
hard-earned savings is not enough. But it is not possible to identify any test for judging when a fee regime
is excessive. It will be easier to judge actual examples of those who assert they have been or will be deterred
by the level of fees imposed’: ibid, [42].
67 Ibid, [44].
68 The scheme in place for those who cannot afford to pay these fees is set out in the Courts and Tribunal Fee
Remissions Order 2013 (SI 2013/2302) as amended by the Courts and Tribunals Fees (Miscellaneous
Amendments) Order 2014 (SI 2014/590). For an explanation of this scheme, see Pyper and McGuiness
(n 51) 8.
69 [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin) [Unison No 2], [4].
70 Ibid, [62], [98].
71 Ibid, [61].
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would be satisfactory to establish that fees have deterred litigants. The paradox of these
cases is that if litigants come to the court as a result of this type of challenge they have the
support of a trade union. There is much to be said about the interpretation of choice in
this context.
Observers of English labour law will note the increasing reference to relevant
Canadian case law in English academic commentaries and again there is occasion
here. The Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of trial hearing fees in Trial
Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General).72 The
facts, briefly, were that the claimant was a qualified veterinary surgeon (not working
at the time) from Europe who was involved in a custody dispute. The Province of
British Columbia started hearing fees with the aim of establishing a revenue neutral
trial service.73 For the claimant’s case, the hearing fee was about $3600 to be paid in
advance of the hearing (neither party was represented by a lawyer). This figure was
equivalent to the net family income. Legal fees leading up to the hearing left savings
depleted. The claimant did not qualify for fee remission (fee waiver). The Supreme
Court ruled that the claimant was exempt from the fee and found the fee scheme uncon-
stitutional. It was left to the Legislature to address points raised in the decision. In com-
parison to the English decisions, the comments from the Canadian Supreme Court recall
Unison’s position: ‘If people cannot bring legitimate issues to court, the creation and
maintenance of positive laws will be hampered, as laws will not be given effect.’74 The
idea of exemptions for the impoverished had been a focal point to the challenge in
England. The Canadian Supreme Court delved further into the matter: ‘ … providing
exemptions to the truly impoverished may set the access bar too high. A fee that is so
high that it requires litigants who are not impoverished to sacrifice reasonable expenses
in order to bring a claim may, absent adequate exemptions, be unconstitutional because
it subjects litigants to undue hardship, thereby effectively depriving access to the
courts.’75 This is not a matter considered by the court in either of the Unison challenges
and yet perceiving of tribunal fees as only being about the ‘poor’ misses the breadth of
this profound issue.
The Coalition’s employment regulation reforms also pose a profound challenge to
the practice of worker-side employment law. As alluded to above, there is likely to be
less work for this cohort of solicitors and barristers because of the financial disincentive.
Moreover, a further consequence of fees is that those who wish to pursue claims may
well do so on their own, depending on the case. For example, data from Payment of Tri-
bunal Awards76 reveals 67% of claimants were likely to seek assistance for an unfair
72 2014 SCC 59 [Trial Lawyers].
73 Ibid, [51].
74 Ibid, [40].
75 Ibid, [46].
76 This report offered insight into the payment of awards made against employers and for this reason is a
valuable resource. It also provided data reflecting on the employment law reforms passed by the Coalition
Government, particularly the procedure for dispute resolution. For discussion, see D Mangan, ‘Assessing
Employment Tribunal Awards’ (2014) 43 Industrial Law Journal 212.
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dismissal claim and 57% sought assistance from solicitors.77 And yet for wage claims,
claimants were more likely to access free advice through the Citizens Advice Bureau
(30%) or Acas (12%).78 Overall, only 42% of claimants had sought advice from legal
professionals. Twenty-five per cent of claimants sought advice from the Citizens’
Advice Bureau, while 19% used family and friends’ assistance. The prospect for
self-representation is readily apparent to those working in employment law.79
Self-representation means greater demands on resources dependent on government
funding which as yet do not seem to be increasing in concert with any foreseeable
increase in use. More profoundly, tribunals will be placed in the unenviable position
of weighing the fact of self-representation and ensuring fairness for those individuals
during proceedings.80 Sadly, circumstances appear to have changed little if practice
evolves in this manner. The reforms are premised on cost certainty for employers
so that the overall numbers are reduced thereby presenting a cost saving through
employment regulation.
As is the case with labour law, there is always a sliver of positive. A recent report
on the workplace defined contribution pension scheme offered some intriguing
points. Though early in its development, this pension scheme ties into the present
discussion insofar as it presents some arguments contrary to recent labour law
trends. In the Regulatory Policy Committee’s Impact Assessment,81 the problem at
which the scheme was aimed was couched within the Office of Fair Trading’s
defined contribution (DC) market study82 which ‘found that competition alone
cannot be relied upon to drive value for money in the DC workplace pension
market due to weaknesses in the buyer side of the market and the complexity of
the product. Government intervention is necessary to ensure all individuals saving
into a workplace pension get value for money.’83 The laissez-faire ethos is put aside
here. Even competition is discounted: government intervention is needed because
‘competition alone’ will not achieve the desired results. Workplace pensions carry
forward one trend of the twenty-first century, downloading responsibility. Pensions
are so important, however, the government is willing to add cost (often called a
77 Payment of Tribunal Awards (n 57) 26.
78 Ibid, 25.
79 Langstaff J, President of the Employment Appeals Tribunal, has predicted such an increase: Senior Presi-
dent Report (n 60) 64.
80 Those who have been in a hearing when a self-represented party presents his/her case can attest to
the great efforts undertaken by those presiding to compensate for the party’s lack of legal back-
ground. Perhaps this explains in part the 50% decrease in the disposal of employment tribunal
claims over the period April–June 2014: Ministry of Justice, ‘Tribunal Statistics Quarterly April–
June 2014’, 11.
81 Michael Gibbons (Chairperson), 17 March 2014, RPC14-DWP-2032 [DC Workplace Pensions Impact
Assessment].
82 Office of Fair Trading, Defined Contribution Workplace Pension Market Study (OFT 1505, 2013).
83 DC Workplace Pensions Impact Assessment (n 81) [no pagination].
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burden in the labour context) to private sector employers.84 This is a noteworthy
development as there is a connection being drawn between government (reductions
in) spending and protection of defined contribution pension remuneration packages
for private sector workers.
(b) Coercion as dispute resolution
If claims are initiated, then they are to be dealt with swiftly. If the claimant brings forward a
claim, the required forms now state median awards.85 These figures are lower and more
representative (£4560) than the average awards (£9133), themselves buoyed by a few larger
sums.86 Figures from the first few months of early conciliation show 17,145 notifications
(of which 540 were by an employer and the remainder by a worker).
With the changes, the expectation is that many cases be disposed of through the
early conciliation process.87 At the outset and before a hearing, workers (‘prospective
claimants’) must report their claims details to Acas.88 The prospective claimant is to
complete a form (online or sent by post) or must call Acas.89 The timeline is up to
‘one calendar month starting on the date of receipt of the form (or call to Acas)’.90
During the prescribed period, a conciliation officer ‘shall… endeavour to promote a
settlement between the persons who would be parties to the proceedings’. This is
achieved by Acas making attempts to contact the prospective claimant and, if
consent is given, the prospective respondent.91 If contact is not made, Acas ‘must
conclude that settlement is not possible’.92 If settlement is not possible or the
period expires, the prospective claimant must obtain a certificate confirming the
close of the prescribed period.93 Still, Acas conciliation is not mandatory (either
party can refuse).94
84 Despite attempts to foster growth in private sector employment. See for example the Private Sector
Employment Indicator, the aim of which is to ‘monitor the underlying growth in private sector employ-
ment’: BIS, ‘Private Sector Employment Indicator, Quarter 4 2013’ (Nov 2013 to Jan 2014) (2014).
85 BIS, Employment Law 2013: Progress on Reform (London: BIS, 2013) [Progress on Reform], 25.
86 Ministry of Justice, ‘Employment Tribunals and EAT Statistics, 2011–12’ (1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012)
(London: Ministry of Justice, 2012).
87 The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (Commencement No 5, Transitional Provisions and
Savings) Order 2014 (SI 2014/253) (in force as of 6 April 2014).
88 Section 7 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 which adds s 18A to the Employment Tri-
bunals Act 1996.
89 Employment Tribunals (Early Conciliation: Exemptions and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2014 (SI
2014/254), Sch, rr 1, 2.
90 Ibid, Sch, r 6(1). An extension of 14 days may occur once upon consent from the prospective claimant and
respondent: Sch, r 6(2), (3).
91 Ibid, Sch, r 5.
92 Ibid, Sch, r 5(3).
93 Ibid, Sch, r 7(2).
94 BIS, Ending the Employment Relationship: Government Response to Consultation (London: BIS, 2013)
[Ending the Employment Relationship], [108].
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Mandatory consultation finds its basis in the idea of costs. Since less than one-
third of claimants sought out Acas, the government speculated this body could
reduce the number of claims reaching the tribunal stage by 12,000.95 Early figures
from Acas show 7% of workers and 9% of employers (where the worker agreed)
opted out of early conciliation.96 Acas updated these figures cumulatively and so
data includes the period from April to September 2014, finding 10% rejected
conciliation.97
Mandating Acas be involved delays expenditure by employers and also means
the claims may potentially be averted. Data from Acas indicates some impact
(though it is difficult to determine its significance at this point) on the early con-
ciliation process. Of the 11,355 cases that ended their early conciliation period in
the period April–June 2014, 1873 cases reached settlement (called COT3) which
was 16.5% of the total.98 The only other data available found 19% of those who
went through conciliation without settlement decided to abandon the claim;99
though there was no indication as to why this decision was taken. Acas’ update
on these figures was cumulative and did not separate findings from the previous
release.100 And so, data covered the period April to September 2014, 17,162 cases
in total. Of these 18% reached COT3 (3046); 24% proceeded to Tribunal (4198);
and 58% (9918) did not proceed. For those who suggested that many
frivolous claims are launched, the 58% of claims that do not proceed may be
viewed as vindication. However, Acas remains unclear as to the reasons for aban-
donment. Here will be a lingering question: how many cases will move to the tri-
bunal stage and for what reasons will cases be abandoned? Tracking all of this
information will be quite important to an overall assessment of the effectiveness
of early conciliation.
If the claim continues past conciliation, the second tier of dispute resolution is the
settlement offer. The amendments to the established settlement offers stand out as a
means of incentivising the early resolution of disputes.101 While it may be said the
95 Resolving Workplace Disputes (n 52) 21–22. WERS 2011, First Findings (n 36) suggested that many may
continue to opt out of this process as the authors found few used dispute resolution: WERS 2011, First
Findings (n 36) 27.
96 This data related to the period April to June 2014. Acas, ‘Early Conciliation Update: Quarter 1 April–June
2014’ (2014) http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=4960 [Acas Quarter 1 Update] accessed 9
January 2015.
97 For this period, Acas reported a total of 37,404 notifications (of which 36,162 were workers and 1242 were
employers making contact with Acas). Acas reported 10% rejected offers of conciliation – 3783 (workers)
and 3727 (employers): Acas ‘Early Conciliation Update: April – September 2014’ (2014) http://www.acas.
org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=5069[Acas 2014 Second Update] accessed 22 January 2015.
98 Acas Quarter 1 Update (n 96).
99 Ibid.
100 Acas 2014 Second Update (n 97).
101 ‘we propose to introduce a Rule whereby either party can make a formal settlement offer to the other party
or parties as part of formal employment tribunal proceedings. This procedure would be backed by a
scheme of penalties and rewards, in order to encourage the making – and acceptance – of reasonable
settlement offers’: Resolving Workplace Disputes (n 52) 37.
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government subscribed to Gibbons’ suggestion of early resolution of disputes (notably at
an informal stage),102 its perspective on early resolution would appear to focus on the
benefits for one side. Section 111A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is an
example. While settlement negotiations remain inadmissible at tribunal,103 the Act
now provides a way for ‘improper behaviour’104 to be put before the tribunal:
(4) In relation to anything said or done which in the tribunal’s opinion was improper, or
was connected with improper behaviour, subsection (1) applies only to the extent that the
tribunal considers just.
(5) Subsection (1) does not affect the admissibility, on any question as to costs or
expenses, of evidence relating to an offer made on the basis that the right to refer to it
on any such question is reserved.
The identified objectives behind a finding of impropriety are of importance because this
behaviour is the benchmark for the admissibility of settlement negotiations:105
we envisage a scheme requiring or empowering an employment tribunal to increase or
decrease the amount of any financial compensation which is ultimately awarded where
parties have made an offer of settlement which has not reasonably been accepted. Wher-
ever no award is made (i.e. the claim is lost), and a reasonable offer of settlement has been
made to the claimant we envisage that such a fact could be used by a tribunal in consider-
ing whether the claimant had pursued the case ‘vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or
otherwise unreasonably’, or in a way that was ‘misconceived’.106
Concerns about improper behaviour and the vexatious suggest that the aim is more
about dispensing with claims. If an offer is not accepted and the claim is lost, the gov-
ernment has enacted a measure that may punish a losing party.107 The focus on boosting
the economy places the emphasis with regard to settlement offers on the disposal of
claims.
To call these changes a commitment to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) would
be a disservice to ADR. Instead, this system of dispute resolution is more in the line of
coerced conflict resolution. From the forms claimants are to fill out (which inform of
102 M Gibbons, Better Dispute Resolution: A Review of Employment Dispute Resolution in Great Britain (DTI
2007), Chapter 2.
103 Section 111A(1), (2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, as amended. This was anticipated in an earlier
government report – ‘we are amending the Employment Rights Act 1996 to provide that an offer of settle-
ment is inadmissible as evidence to an employment tribunal in any subsequent unfair dismissal claim –
effectively extending the existing “without prejudice” regime to situations where no formal dispute has
yet arisen’: Ending the Employment Relationship (n 94) [24].
104 A similar point can be made about s 15 of the ERRA (amending s 124 of the Employment Rights Act 1996)
which permits the employment tribunal to increase or decrease a compensatory award based on improper
conduct.
105 Government seeks to protect both parties from ‘improper behaviour’ and if this is found the rule regarding
the inadmissibility of settlement agreements will not apply: Ending the Employment Relationship (n 94)
[37].
106 Resolving Workplace Disputes (n 52) 37.
107 The power to award costs against parties pursuant to rr 75 and 76 in the 2013 Regulations is a further
consideration to bringing an employment claim.
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median awards figures) to claimants’ obligation to report claims to Acas first, procedure
is tailored to put the emphasis on claimants and keep it there. Employment claims
(moving forward) will be a war of attrition which workers are not well equipped to
survive. There are built-in steps that (using the gambling analogy common amongst
critics of employment protections) make employment actions a poor bet despite the
hand one may have.
B. The Unproductive Weakening of Labour Employment Law
The Coalition Government reforms have weakened labour law and arguably challenged
innovation/growth. These developments stifle productive innovation when it comes to
managing personnel because so much has been done to eliminate concerns about work-
force management: problems are fixed by relaxed employment regulation and so
decisions about the workforce garner less than a productive amount of attention. To
be clear, this argument is not a generalisation of English enterprise. Instead, as
happens too often with blunt one-size-fits-all reforms, those who are engaged in good
practices which usefully maximise human resources are insufficiently recognised
because attention is diverted to those less than stellar examples. The argument here is
that the foundations of the reforms are more of a quicksand than solid ground.
As a motivation, facilitating growth for small to medium-sized businesses is an
understandable strategy. According to 2013 statistics from BIS, small to medium-
sized firms accounted for a combined 59.3% of UK private sector employment and
they constituted about 99.9% of private sector businesses.108 Between 2000 and 2013
SMEs have grown rapidly, increasing in number by about 41% during that
period.109 Given this figure, it is comprehensible why the government’s current plan
for employment regulation focuses more squarely on this group. Sixty-eight per cent
of claims were made against this cohort: 33% of claimants filed cases against employers
with 1 to 9 employees; 35% against employers employing between 10 and 49 workers;
11% against undertakings with 50 to 249 workers.110And yet, there is reason to raise
questions. In the SME Business Barometer February 2014,111 SME employers were
asked (based on a list read to them) which represented an obstacle to the success of
their businesses. Sixty-two per cent identified the economy (which was 10% less
than the June 2013 figure); 49% cited taxation; 21% identified staff recruitment
(though what this term refers to is unclear) and this was up from 16% in June
2013. By using SMEs as a target group, the aims of employment regulation have
shifted to that of an easy-to-use format where ease in engaging workers (with
108 BIS, Business Population Estimates for the UK and Regions 2013 (London: BIS, 2013) [Business Population
2013].
109 Ibid, 5.
110 Payment of Tribunal Awards (n 57) 20.
111 SME Business Barometer February 2014 (London: BIS, 2014) [SME Business Barometer February 2014], 32.
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minimal regulatory considerations) is facilitated. The reform package charts a retrench-
ment of the parameters for access to redress which has the potential to limit the enfor-
cement of recognised employment rights, especially when determined by their impact
on business.
Several considerations suggest that this cohort forms a dubious premise for such sig-
nificant regulation. First, SMEs prefer to have an informal workplace;112 that is, few if
any formal written policies.113 Gibbons wrote that small businesses preferred the infor-
mal workplace because expressing ‘problems in writing can act as a trigger for greater
conflict’.114
Consequently, and second, this choice exposes them to greater potential liability at
employment tribunals for the absence of formal procedures. A large number of workers
in businesses of between five and nine were highly likely to have a positive view of the
workplace.115 Despite this, empirical evidence underlined the accompanying risk:
‘Wider research has shown that small employers are more likely to be involved in,
and lose, employment tribunals, particularly those that did not follow formal
processes when dealing with disputes’.116 The reason for loss at the employment tribunal
was not singularly attributable to the absence of human resources support117
because the application of procedures ‘makes the difference between winning or
losing a case’.118
Third, while SMEs are the fastest growing entity in the private sector, much of that
growth is the result of increases in the number of businesses with no employees.119 BIS
speculated that ‘tough labour market conditions…may have encouraged people to set
up in business as they are made redundant.’120 ONS data suggested 15% of the total
workforce were self-employed in 2014.121 Based on BIS’ Business Population 2013, the
number of businesses that employ individuals currently sits at 100,000 more in 2013
than in 2000. This is quite a modest increase. There has been a movement from large
entities (250 plus workers) to smaller, sole proprietor enterprises: at the start of 2013,
28.5% of private sector businesses were companies while 62.6% were sole
112 It is interesting to note the difference in attitude. An Acas case study on Blue Earth Foods conveys one
example. Starting up in 2009 with 15 employees, Blue Earth grew fairly rapidly and in 2012 had over
300 workers (240 permanent and 80 agency). This growth prompted the hiring of the company’s first
HR manager the same year who summed up the challenge posed by the rapid growth: ‘We’ve got to
turn that nice, friendly, company into an organization that makes money’.
113 Employers who do not have procedures were identified as smaller sized operations in the Workplace
Employment Relations Study: WERS 2011, First Findings (n 36) 27.
114 Gibbons (n 102) 2.11.
115 This figure was found to be 82%: WERS 2011 Final (n 37) 164.
116 Jordan and others (n 29) citing G Saridakis and others, ‘The Impact of Enterprise Size on Employment
Tribunal Incidence and Outcomes: Evidence from Britain’ (2008) 46 British Journal of Industrial Relations
469 [Saridakis and others].
117 Saridakis and others (n 117), 492.
118 Ibid, 493.
119 Business Population 2013 (n 109) 5–6.
120 Ibid.
121 ONS, ‘Self-Employed Workers in the UK – 2014’ (2014), 1.
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proprietorships (of which only 9% employ anyone). (There was a small increase (2.2%)
in large businesses between 2012 and 2013.) Employment since 2008 has ‘predomi-
nantly’ increased as a result of self-employment.122 For example, between the first
quarter 2008 and the second quarter 2014, employment rose by 1.1 million, but of
that 732,000 were self-employed.123 There is a curious duality evident. Regulation is
being undertaken in favour of the cohort. However, translation into increased employ-
ment is not arising: 22% of SMEs employed fewer people by February 2014 than they did
by February 2013. Only 18% employed more workers. Surveys in February and June
2013 (immediately after extending the qualifying period for unfair dismissal protection
from one to two years) show that 19% and 12% (respectively) hired more workers than
in the previous 12-month period. In the same period, 21% and 28% (respectively) had
fewer workers. It may be reasonable to assume SMEs need to feel secure before they hire.
And yet, indications are that SMEs have a positive mindset: 74% made a profit in the
previous 12-month period; 85% expect to make a profit in the next 12-month period;
66% aim to grow their business in the next two to three years. Overall there was a
rise (13%) in the number of respondents who increased their profit from one year
prior and 36% of SMEs improved their turnover (the largest 12-month increase in
the Barometer’s history dating back to 2008). In the next 12-month period, only 23%
indicated they would employ more people versus 68% who would remain at status
quo. In fact, the ‘proportion of SME employers employing fewer has been higher
than those employing more in every Barometer’.124
Fourth, another difficulty with regulating to the benefit of the SME cohort is they
are most likely to be unaware of the assistance being provided to them.125 The report
of Jordan and others identified this curiosity: ‘There was no evidence that these
employers were aware of the increased qualifying period for unfair dismissal’.126
SMEs’ anxiety has driven these changes and yet that anxiety will remain.127 The dif-
ficulty here lies not in regulation but in informing a reluctant group. SMEs’ inflated
sense of risk in the absence of accurate information (and one could add reinforcing
such an attitude by legislation) sets a dubious foundation for the success of reform
efforts: since ‘these employers felt they were at risk of litigation there was little motiv-
ation to change their working practices because they believed that working informally
122 Ibid, 3.
123 Ibid, 4. The ONS report speculated that factors such as working past pension age and the absence of
employment opportunities contributed to the higher number of individuals remaining in self-
employment.
124 SME Business Barometer February 2014 (n 112) 8.
125 Ignorance of the law or other information is not unique to the SME cohort, but it is a focus here as the
findings challenge the merits of legislating in favour of this uninformed group. American studies, for
example, have found workers to be unaware of their own employment protections: C Sunstein,
‘Human Behavior and the Law of Work’ (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 205; P Kim, ‘Bargaining with
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World’
(1997–98) 83 Cornell Law Review 105.
126 Jordan and others (n 29) 29.
127 See ibid, i.
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maintained better working relationships with staff and ensured managerial auton-
omy’.128 The adage regarding to where good intentions lead comes to mind.
SMEs seek free, bespoke materials readily accessible at any point in time and the
Coalition vindicated this desire with its reforms. There is cause for pessimism that
these changes will have the desired effect.129 Only 9% of SMEs sought advice from
lawyers. Younger businesses (0–3 years of existence) were more likely to seek out
advice or information (64%). Micros (1–9 employees) were most likely to not know
where to go for advice or information. Most of those seeking advice or information
desired financial advice on the running of the business (23%) or business plans or strat-
egy (22%). Only 8% identified employment law/redundancy as a reason for seeking
external assistance. As opposed to purchasing advice, SMEs are increasingly relying on
mentors,130 underlining the no-cost version of advice.
Cost-sharing seems to be the government’s next step. What SMEs may not know is
that this plan involves them. Regional Mediation Pilot schemes in Cambridge and Man-
chester trained a group of employees from 24 SMEs to be mediators in order to help to
resolve workplace disputes in the future.131 SMEs have been asked to band together to
solve workplace issues. Creating a pool of mediators who will service an area appears to
be the goal. When will these mediations occur? Will these employees be asked to mediate
outside work hours? Will they be paid for conducting mediations? It is unclear what
incentive there would be for the besieged SME cohort to take employee time away
from their businesses.
The ease with which enterprises may retain and remove workers (in addition to the
issue of redress) undervalues the importance of people being in paid work. The Bank of
England has utilised the unemployment rate as a guide for informing its own economic
policy:132 7% unemployment had been the target set in 2013 by the Bank before it would
raise the Bank rate from 0.5%.133 Since that time, unemployment has been on a down-
ward trend: 7.7% in September 2013,134 6.5% in May 2014,135 6.2% in May–July 2014
(the lowest since late 2008)136 and 6% as of October 2014.137 While unemployment
128 Ibid, ii.
129 Ibid, iv.
130 SME Business Barometer February 2014 (n 112) 64.
131 BIS, ‘Regional Mediation Pilot Schemes up and Running’ (2012) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
regional-mediation-pilot-schemes-up-and-running accessed 9 January 2015.
132 Bank of England, Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting 3 and 4 September 2013 [Minutes
2013].
133 Minutes 2013 (n 133), [20].
134 ONS, ‘More People in Employment Compared with the Previous Quarter and the Previous Year’ (11 Septem-
ber 2013) http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/september-2013/sty-employment.html
accessed 9 January 2015.
135 Office for National Statistics (ONS), UK Labour Market, July 2014 (Newport: ONS, 2014). The Bank of
England placed the Labour Force Survey unemployment rate at 6.4% as of September 2014: Bank of
England, Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting 3–4 September 2014 [Minutes 2014], [23].
136 ONS, UK Labour Market, September 2014 (Newport: ONS, 2014).
137 ONS, Labour Market Statistics, October 2014 (Newport: ONS, 2014).
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figures show an increase in the number of people finding work, an important fact should
be identified. A comparison of ONS data between May–July 2008 and the same period in
2013 shows that 328,000 more people were employed in 2013 than 2008.138 Much of the
increase can be attributed to part-time employment being more available than full-time
work: a jump from 689,000 individuals in part-time employment in this period in 2008
to 1.45 million in 2013. The 7% unemployment figure that was identified as a threshold
in 2013 has been a difficult one to pin down. For example, it does not factor in the type
of employment. All forms of employment effect a decrease in unemployment. The type
of work, however, should matter because regulation which facilitates the ‘plugging in’ of
workers when needed and ‘unplugging’ them when not falls short of meeting anything
more than a superficial target prone to perpetual fluctuation. A constant flow of new
entry workers to unemployment after short periods of work leaves unemployment
figures in constant peril, if a certain threshold of unemployment is viewed as a
minimum for Bank action. At its essence, this form of employment regulation views
English workers simply as a workforce to be accessed when needed. It leaves people
in a continual search for secure work. The Bank of England noted that labour costs
‘per unit of output were currently rising by only around 1% per year, considerably
weaker than was consistent with the inflation target in the long run’.139 Vulnerability
persists when it comes to the ability of workers to face shocks to income and interest
rates.140 Wages have fallen about a tenth since the economic crisis began (a fall not
seen in the country since the 1920s).141 Government policy facilitating the easy increase
of unemployment numbers may not be one supporting sustainable economic recovery.
Overall, as a way of putting people to work, the procedural reforms remain curious
because they facilitate greater ease in dismissing workers and deterring associated
claims against employers.
(a) Authoring the definitive narrative
The Coalition package of labour law reforms betrays an unproductive attitude.142 Com-
menting on the 2008 amendments of the Labour Government, Sanders characterised
them as ‘the start of a new era in unfair dismissal law in which “economic prosperity”
138 ONS, ‘More People in Employment Compared with the Previous Quarter and the Previous Year’
(11 September 2013) http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/september-2013/
sty-employment.html accessed 9 January 2015.
139 Minutes 2014 (n 136) [34].
140 As noted in the Bank of England’s Inflation Report August 2014 (n 32).
141 Bank of England, ‘Speech Given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England at the 146th Annual
Trades Union Congress, Liverpool’ (9 September 2014), 5.
142 The financial penalties provisions for failure to pay sums ordered by employment tribunals contained in
the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, c.26 (Royal Assent 30 March 2015) adding ss
37A– 37Q to the Employment Tribunals Act 1996) does little to rebalance matters. The Act Bill appears to
address the issue of low levels of payment by respondents to employment tribunal awards as outlined in
Payment of Tribunal Awards (n 57).
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dominates “social justice” to a degree not seen before’.143 With the Coalition changes,
labour law has become just a resource for economic recovery.
The long-term implication of this troublingly negative rhetoric about workers is a
perpetual call for employment regulation reform which supports economic growth.144
While not official government policy, Sir Adrian Beecroft’s report spoke to the economic
imperative directly. He wrote that the impact of employment reform would be wide-
spread – ‘an instant improvement in performance in a significant part of the national
workforce’.145 He went further to claim that reform is badly needed because only
then would the onus be placed on workers to
perform well enough for the employer to value them as workers. It would no longer be
possible to coast along, underperforming in a way that is damaging to the enterprise con-
cerned but not bad enough for the employer to want to undertake the whole rigmarole of
the unfair dismissal process with its attendant threats of tribunals and discrimination
charges.146
Consider that the Prime Minister commissioned Sir Adrian’s report. This unrelentingly
negative perception about the English workforce informs government policy. If the
dominant view of workers remains one of widespread lethargy, it would appear that
the problemmoves beyond employment regulation to something more pervasive requir-
ing attitudinal change. It remains a challenge to see how this situation could be entirely
attributable to employment regulation alone, if at all.147 Furthermore, it appears as
though the rhetoric has outpaced the reality. Part of the argument for toughening
employment tribunal access is that ‘many claimants who have unfortunately not
found a new job have time on their hands and view a free employment tribunal as a
no cost option on winning an award’.148 A study commissioned by BIS suggested
there was little to support such assertions. Only 7% of claimants had previously made
a claim.149 Seventy-two per cent of claimants were employed at the time researchers
interviewed them.150 Fifty-eight per cent of those who had been in work at the time
of both launching a claim and interview for the study were earning a similar level to
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Journal 30, 31.
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proceed.’ Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) Hansard HC Deb 12 September 2013, vol 567,
col 1247.
145 A Beecroft, Report on Employment Law (London: BIS, 2011), 5.
146 Ibid. The assertion also suggests little confidence in tribunals and courts – another point which lacks merit
beyond the bombastic, especially considering low claimant success rates (if one measures tribunal effi-
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150 Ibid, 15. Fifty-eight per cent were in full-time and 26% in part-time work: ibid, 17.
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that made before the claim.151 In fact, 13% were working for the same employer at the
time of their claim.152
Still, the Coalition links employment tribunal reforms with economic growth. To
effect this development, emphasis is placed on cutting employment costs such as
those related to claims brought by workers or former workers: ‘The risk is that the
fear of being faced with tribunal claims impedes growth because businesses become
too cautious to hire people or to address capability issues in the workforce’.153 The
current plan takes a singular approach: if claims arise, they should be disposed of
before employers are to expend any financial resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
Duress forms a common theme between the disintegration of collective labour law and
the diminution of individual employment protections. The concept of duress was used
to connect economic stagnation with employment regulation. Legislation and policy
have been utilised to correct this problem. The question as to the actual coercive
force of any worker towards her employer chips away at the premise of contemporary
government’s motivations. It cannot be maintained that now workers who face signifi-
cant hurdles in even bringing forward an employment rights claim may exert duress on
enterprises, and therefore the economy. The unfortunate conclusion that one comes to is
that English labour law reforms have aimed to reverse the practical effect of employment
protections by organic dissuasion; that is, placing obstacles in the way of bringing a claim
forward (despite its merits).
Inevitably, the labour law community returns to the same question: what is labour
law about? Recent reforms to access to employment tribunals and the correlating ‘dis-
incentives’ to bringing a claim impinge upon another central tenet, dispute resolution.
The lopsided nature of the present system poses a serious question about not only access
but also the future of labour law. The disintegration of employment regulation as offer-
ing protection to a full range of workers presaged the reconfiguration of access to dispute
resolution. These are by-products of viewing labour law as a support to economic
growth. The rising force of the adverse attitude towards employment regulation (and
perhaps even talk of enforcing rights) is the most dangerous challenge to access to
rights redress.
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